The Singularity

According to techno-futurists, the exponential development of technology in general and artificial intelligence (“AI”) in particular — including the complete digital replication of human brains — will radically transform humanity via two revolutions. The first is the "singularity," when artificial intelligence will redesign itself recursively and progressively, such that AI will become vastly more powerful than human intelligence ("super strong AI"). The second revolution will be "virtual immortality," when the fullness of our mental selves can be uploaded perfectly to non-biological media (such as silicon chips), and our mental selves will live on beyond the demise of our fleshy, physical bodies. 

AI singularity and virtual immortality would mark a startling, transhuman world that techno-futurists envision as inevitable and perhaps just over the horizon. They do not question whether their vision can be actualized; they only debate when it will occur, with estimates ranging from 10 to 100 years.

I'm not so sure. Actually, I'm a skeptic — not because I doubt the science, but because I challenge the philosophical foundation of the claims. Consciousness is the elephant in the room, and most techno-futurists do not see it. Whatever consciousness may be, it affects the nature of the AI singularity and determines whether virtual immortality is even possible.

It is an open question, post-singularity, whether super strong AI without inner awareness would be in all respects just as powerful as super strong AI with inner awareness, and in no respects deficient? In other words, are there kinds of cognition that, in principle or of necessity, require true consciousness? For assessing the AI singularity, the question of consciousness is profound.

Is virtual immortality possible?

Now, what about virtual immortality — digitizing and uploading the fullness of one's first-person mental self (the "I") from wet, mushy, physical brains that die and decay to new, more permanent (non-biological) media or substrates? Could this actually work?

Again, the possibilities for virtual immortality relate to each of the alternative causes of consciousness.

1. If consciousness is entirely physical, then our first-person mental self would be uploadable, and some kind of virtual immortality would be attainable. The technology might take hundreds or thousands of years — not decades, as techno-optimists believe — but barring human-wide catastrophe, it would happen. 

2. If consciousness is an independent, non-reducible feature of physical reality, then it would be possible that our first-person mental self could be uploadable — though less clearly than in No. 1 above, because not knowing what this consciousness-causing feature would be, we could not know whether it could be manipulated by technology, no matter how advanced. But because consciousness would still be physical, efficacious manipulation and successful uploading would seem possible. 

3. If consciousness is a non-reducible feature of each and every elementary physical field and particle (panpsychism), then it would seem probable that our first-person mental self would be uploadable, because there would probably be regularities in the way particles would need to be aggregated to produce consciousness, and if regularities, then advanced technologies could learn to control them.

4. If consciousness is a radically separate, nonphysical substance (dualism), then it would seem impossible to upload our first-person mental self by digitally replicating the brain, because a necessary cause of our consciousness, this nonphysical component, would be absent. 

5. If consciousness is ultimate reality, then consciousness would exist of itself, without any physical prerequisites. But would the unique digital pattern of a complete physical brain (derived, in this case, from consciousness) favor a specific segment of the cosmic consciousness (i.e., our unique first-person mental self)? It's not clear, in this extreme case, that uploading would make much difference (or much sense).

In trying to distinguish these alternatives, I am troubled by a simple observation. Assume that a perfect digital replication of my brain does, in fact, generate human-level consciousness (surely alternative 1, possibly 2, probably 3, not 4, 5 doesn’t matter). This would mean that my first-person self and personal awareness could be uploaded to a new medium (non biological or even, for that matter, a new biological body). But if "I" can be replicated once, then I can be replicated twice; and if twice, then an unlimited number of times.

So, what happens to my first-person inner awareness? What happens to my "I"? 

Assume I do the digital replication procedure and it works perfectly — say, five times.

Where is my first-person inner awareness located? Where am I?

Each of the five replicas would state with unabashed certainty that he is "Robert Kuhn," and no one could dispute them. (For simplicity of the argument, physical appearances of the clones are neutralized.) Inhabiting my original body, I would also claim to be the real “me,” but I could not prove my priority.

I'll frame the question more precisely. Comparing my inner awareness from right before to right after the replications, will I feel or sense differently? Here are four obvious possibilities, with their implications:

I do not sense any difference in my first-person awareness. This would mean that the five replicates are like super-identical twins — they are independent conscious entities, such that each begins instantly to diverge from the others. This would imply that consciousness is the local expression or manifestation of a set of physical factors or patterns. (An alternative explanation would be that the replicates are zombies, with no inner awareness — a charge, of course, they will deny and denounce.)

My first-person awareness suddenly has six parts — my original and the five replicates in different locations — and they all somehow merge or blur together into a single conscious frame, the six conscious entities fusing into a single composite (if not coherent) "picture." In this way, the unified effect of my six conscious centers would be like the "binding problem" on steroids. (The binding problem in psychology asks how do our separate sense modalities like sight and sound come together such that our normal conscious experience feels singular and smooth, not built up from discrete, disparate elements). This would mean that consciousness has some kind of overarching presence or a kind of supra-physical structure.

My personal first-person awareness shifts from one conscious entity to another, or fragments, or fractionates. These states are logically (if remotely) possible, but only, I think, if consciousness would be an imperfect, incomplete emanation of evolution, devoid of fundamental grounding. 

My personal first-person awareness disappears upon replication, although each of the six (original plus five) claims to be the original and really believes it. (This, too, would make consciousness even more mysterious.)

Suppose, after the replicates are made, the original (me) is destroyed. What then? Almost certainly my first-person awareness would vanish, although each of the five replicates would assert indignantly that he is the real "Robert Kuhn" and would advise, perhaps smugly, not to fret over the deceased and discarded original.

At some time in the future, assuming that the deep cause of consciousness permits this, the technology will be ready. If I were around, would I submit? I might, because I'm confident that 1 (above) is true and 2, 3 and 4 are false, and that the replication procedure would not affect my first-person mental self one whit. (So I sure wouldn't let them destroy the original.)

Bottom line, for me for now: The AI singularity and virtual immortality must confront the deep cause of consciousness.